WITNESS THE ENIGMATIC BEAUTY OF PROOF BY INTIMIDATION

Krauss states that "not-architecture is, according to the logic of a certain kind of expansion, just another way of expressing the term landscape, and the not-landscape is, simply, architecture" (283, Krauss).
So she tells us, straitforwardly, that the negation of landscape is architecture. By using mathematical statements of logical equivalence, she is basically saying that modernist sculpture, or in other words "not-architecture and not-landscape" is really, or simply (as Krauss would have it), "landscape and architecture," since landscape and architecture both have their own logically equivalent alternative names. How is it then that she later tells us that modernist sculpture is not the same as "site construction," its logical equivalent? How is it possible that she can differentiate between the two, when the logic that she used to derive its combinatory components tells us that they are not different at all, but in fact, "simply," the same?
Answer: In math, all terms, or "vocabulary" are defined to the point of complete unambiguity; a mathematical statement must be devoid of all such ambiguities if we are to begin even the most basic topics of mathematical discourse. On the contrary, the english language is full, rich in connotations and ambiguities, with any one word having many different meanings. Essentially, Krauss uses mathematical logic to "prove" something about the categorization of art, and when the logic frame of math doesn't fit her needs anymore, she shifts over to an opposing frame of logic to incorrectly, wrongly, falsely, prove her point.
Mathematically, modernist sculpture is the same as any of the other three terms on Krauss' diagram -- however, she uses the different combinations of wording (which are logicallly equivalent if her initial statements are to hold true) to mean different things; after all, the "negative" of something has somewhat of a dual meaning, it could mean either an absense, or it could mean an exclusion: an absense entails that there remains nothing, while an exclusion entails that there remains anything but the mentioned thing (mathematical logic is defined more closely as the latter). To understand why Krauss places pieces such as Smithson's Spiral Jetty into the marked-site category, you have to understand that she deems not-landscape as DIFFERENT from architecture, even though she clearly and unambiguously defined them for us as "simply, the SAME."
Notice what this says about Krauss. Right at the offset, Krauss essentially states that our reason for categorizing these new artworks as sculpture is because of "historicism" (277), in other words because we are comforted by this feeling of familiarity which we achieve by placing new things in old categories. As a consequence, as Krauss whimsicallly states, "And so we stare at the pit in earth and think we both do and don't know what sculpture is." So Krauss shares an intimate passion with disambiguity; but why would she criticize others' methods for categorization, if her own broken method of categorization is bent on ambiguity? The source of her argument depends on it, why if her logic weren't broken, she would have concluded that all four categories in this so called expanded field are the same, and she'd be right back where the other art critics are. Shameful that her method for disproving others' methods is itself a disprovable method (and by rightful means this time).
Thinking on the larger picture of Krauss' discourse, her motivation for arguing with the typical method of historicism was that it vaguely coats over obviously distinct and independent elements, elements with their own defining particularities, or distinctive qualities or what have you. So then why would she even bother to categorize these remaining artworks into smaller categories, if the artworks themselves all differ so much from piece to piece as well? Why categorize, if the simple act of categorizing is the act of drawing new, unknown elements into a better defined, familiar, coherent mass that exists for the sole purpose of comforting Krauss herself, by this familiarity which she so despises?