Conceptual Art: The Irrational Enlightenment

Early in his article, Buchloh states that Sol Lewitt’s work, or should I say art proposition, attempted to approach a particular “final destiny of tautology” (517). But how is this different from the logic Stella alludes to? Are not all works of art formulated around indirect speech? They are visual rather than audio representations after all. In his effort to define the practices associated with modern Conceptual art, Buchloh blurs the distinction between perceptual and conceptual experience through the use of excessive terminology. I am still unclear on what is traditional in Conceptual Art, and how irrationality is associated to Conceptual Art.

When describing Weiner’s two squares as objects that manifest both a physical and perceptual interdependence, Buchloh is concise in his claims of a withdrawal experience and how it makes the installation more than an aesthetic device, but also a visual interruption. As in Gordon Matta-Clark’s Splitting, a devoid or semi-inclusive object can be placed in a gallery for spectators to observe, both aesthetically and in relation to its missing parts. However, Buchloh fails to detail how Weiner’s two squares function, if at all, “on both the level of institutional order and on that of private ownership” (527). What does he mean by institutional order? Are these two squares not entirely a conception of private instance? Furthermore, if institutions influence individual perceptions, why does he place them as distinct factors?